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I. INTRODUCTION
Whether begging is speech protected by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution presents important questions about the rights of less
fortunate citizens and the ability of government officials to control the public
environment. The question also raises provocative doctrinal issues.
Although the Supreme Court has not decided whether begging is protected
by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, the Court has held that
solicitation is protected speech.' Restrictions of commercial solicitation "need
only be tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a substantial state interest in
order to survive First Amendment scrutiny." 2 Thus, if begging is character-
ized as commercial solicitation, it certainly is possible, although not clear, that
state and local governments will be able to justify regulating begging. Given
the state of First Amendment law, any analysis of begging under the First
* Professor of Law, Rutgers-The State University-School of Law-Camden. A.B. 1958,
Oberlin College; J.D. 1961, Harvard University.
1. See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1797 (1993).
2. Id. at 1798.
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Amendment also must consider the cases about charitable solicitation3 and the
application of the test set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v.
O'Brien4 for laws that regulate conduct and have an incidental effect on
speech.
In 1990 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in Young v. New York
City Transit Authoriy that begging could be prohibited in the New York City
subways." In July 1993 another panel of the Second Circuit held in Loper v.
New York City Police Department that a generally applicable prohibition of
begging violated the First Amendment.8 Although it might seem fairly easy
to explain the difference in results by reference to the public forum doctrine,9
whether begging is protected raises issues that go beyond the public forum
doctrine. The opinions in these cases show a sharp contrast in approach.
Unlike the panel in Loper, the Young court found that the goal of the beggar,
to obtain money, renders the activity conduct rather than speech."0 There is
substantial merit in that approach, and Part II of this Article will argue for its
use by the Supreme Court. First, though, Part I will discuss the question of
protecting begging under present First Amendment doctrine.
H. BEGGING UNDER PRESENT DOCTRINE
A. Introduction
Begging, as used here, refers to requests for money as well as the receipt
of money under circumstances in which the giver expects nothing in return.
Usually, the giver assumes, either because of the appearance of, or representa-
tions made by, the one requesting money, that the recipient needs the money
to obtain the basic necessities of life. One writer used the term "personal
3. Two recent Supreme Court cases are International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) [hereinafter ISKCON I] and Lee v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992) [hereinafter ISKCON II]. Note that the
concurring and dissenting opinions in both cases are printed following the Court's opinion in
ISKCON II.
4. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
5. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990) (mem).
6. Id. at 148.
7. 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
8. Id. at 706; accord Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991); C.C.B. v.
Florida, 458 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Contra People v. Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr.
2d 486 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1993).
9. The generally applicableprohibition extended to the streets and sidewalks of New York,
areas that constitute public fora, see, e.g., Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,
515 (1939), whereas the subways arguably do not constitute public fora. See Young, 903 F.2d
at 162.
10. 903 F.2d at 154. The court did not rest its decision on that distinction. Id.
[Vol. 46:215
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begging" to describe the activity." Because most people have sympathy for
the plight of the homeless and other needy people, there is a tendency for that
sympathy to drive the discussion of whether begging constitutes protected
speech. For example, Helen Hershkoff and Adam S. Cohen, in arguing that
prohibitions on begging violate the First Amendment, begin their article by
focusing on the plight of an individual beggar, "a poor woman with serious
medical problems... [who] was telling passersby that she was hung-
ry ... "12 The authors seem to take the position that to allow begging will
result in a wider awareness of the problems of the homeless, an awareness that
presumably might apply political pressure to remedy the underlying conditions
that give rise to begging. As they see it, begging serves the underlying
purposes of the First Amendment precisely because of its "engagement
value."" They describe engagement value in the following terms:
Mainstream listeners find begging profoundly disturbing in part
because it violates the rule of phantom normalcy. The presence of beggars
makes it impossible for them to be oblivious to the poverty in their midst.
A simple walk down the street becomes a grim confrontation with a poor
person telling her story. The interruption may annoy the listener; he may
have no interest in being drawn into contact with a person society tells him
to regard as strange and unstable."4
That the intrusion may annoy or even threaten passersby suggests to some
people that it may constitute an invasion of one's personal space. After all,
while someone may have the freedom to speak, others do not have an
obligation to listen. Begging presents a conflict precisely because of its
intrusive nature.
Engagement value implicates personal privacy concerns that presumably
the government may act to protect. Undoubtedly the presence of beggars may
highlight the existence of serious problems that warrant public concern.
Similarly, certain kinds of criminal activity highlight social problems. For
instance, blocking access to abortion clinics or killing doctors who perform
abortions may have the intended effect of communicating opposition to
abortion. But the question of whether the First Amendment insulates begging
from regulation is decided by addressing the conflict, not by avoiding its
existence. Thus, one cannot help but wonder whether some peoples' desire
to treat begging as protected speech reflects less a concern with speech and
11. Paul G. Chevigny, Begging and the First Amendment: Young v. New York City Transit
Authority, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 525, 526 (1991).
12. Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Commentary, Begging to Differ: The First
Amendment and the Right to Beg, 104 HARv. L. REV. 896, 896 (1991).
13. Id. at 910-16.
14. Id. at 912.
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debate than a concern with the underlying social problem. As Hershkoff and
Cohen see it:
[laws that prohibit begging] are also troubling because they silence debate
about social policies toward the poor. Large numbers of Americans are
homeless, destitute, and hungry. Our society has chosen not to alleviate
their plight. Prohibiting begging tells the poor not only that they must
suffer, but also that they will be punished by making direct requests for
help.15
On the other hand, begging itself probably will not solve the problems of
the poor and the homeless,' 6 and its protection may seriously undermine the
ability of the police to protect the urban environment. 7 While the cause of
the poor may be meritorious, the question of whether the First Amendment
protects begging should not hinge on whether the poor deserve protection. 8
Rather, courts must apply First Amendment doctrine to determine whether
governmental regulation or suppression of begging protects legitimate interests
or suppresses protected communication. Although the Supreme Court has not
spoken on the issue, two Justices have made comments that reflect the conflict
inherent in the issue. In United States v. Kokinda"9 Justice O'Connor
observed (for herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and Scalia)
that "residents of metropolitan areas know from daily experience, confronta-
15. Id. at 896-97.
16. See Chevigny, supra note 11, at 527.
17. In Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993), the police
assert[ed] that beggars tend to congregate in certain areas and become more
aggressive as they do so. Residents are intimidated and local businesses suffer
accordingly. Panhandlers are said to station themselves in front of banks, bus stops,
automated teller machines and parking lots and frequently engage in conduct
described as "intimidating" and "coercive." Panhandlers have been known to block
the sidewalk, follow people down the street and threaten those who do not give them
money. It is said that they often make false and fraudulent representations to induce
passers-by to part with their money.
Id. at 701. The court held that the general ban on begging nevertheless violated the First
Amendment. Id. at 706.
18. In light of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), one certainly can argue
that courts should protect the politically powerless. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsmTR 103 (1980).
But that argument relates more to equal protection rather than to what constitutes protected
expression. In any event, such an argument has not led the courts to reorder political priorities
in the distribution of resources. See Weinburger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
19. 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (plurality opinion).
[Vol. 46:215
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tion by a person asking for money disrupts passage and is more intrusive and
intimidating than an encounter with a person giving out information."'° She
subsequently repeated the statement in ISKCON I when she concurred in
upholding a ban on solicitation in an airport.2" However, Justice O'Connor
joined the Court in striking down a ban on leafletting in ISKCON H2
Justice Souter, dissenting in ISKCON I (he would have held that a ban on
solicitation also violated the First Amendment), commented, "While a solicitor
can be insistent, a pedestrian on the street or airport concourse can simply
walk away or walk on. I
B. Commercial Speech
Arguably, begging constitutes commercial solicitation because it involves
the transfer of money to a person who uses it for his own purposes. As such,
it would enjoy First Amendment protection but to a lesser degree than other
forms of protected speech.24 One advocate for full First Amendment
protection of begging argued that begging cannot be commercial speech
because the one who gives money to a beggar receives nothing in return.
z5
That reasoning fails to consider that money goes to the beggar for the beggar's
personal use. Thus, since begging is for personal gain and lacks an eleemosy-
nary motive, it more closely resembles commercial solicitation than charitable
solicitation.
In Edenfield v. Fane26 the Supreme Court struck down a ban on client
solicitation by certified public accountants "in the business context."27 The
Court found that the solicitation was "commercial expression to which the
protections of the First Amendment apply."' Because the regulated speech
was commercial solicitation, the Court held that the regulation at issue "need
20. Id. at 734.
21.ISKON II, 112 S. Ct. at 2713.
22. Id. 2713-15.
23. Id. at 2725 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
24. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
25. Charles F. Knapp, Note, Statutory Restriction of Panhandling in Light of Young v. New
York City Transit: Are States Begging Out of First Amendment Proscriptions?, 76 IowA L. REv.
405, 419-20 (1991).
26. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
27. Id. at 1796. Given the context of the discussion, the Supreme Court might be more
inclined to uphold such a ban outside of the commercial context. The Court found that
solicitation posed none of the dangers that in-person solicitation by lawyers could pose because
"Fane's prospective clients are sophisticated and experienced business executives. . . ." Id. at
1802-03.
28. Id. at 1797.
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only be tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a substantial state interest in
order to survive First Amendment scrutiny."29 The Court distinguished
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n," a case that upheld the regulation of in-
person solicitation by lawyers. In doing so, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Court, explained that "the constitutionality of a ban on personal solicitation
will depend upon the identity of the parties and the precise circumstances of
the solicitation. "31 Justice Kennedy also pointed out, "Even solicitation that
is neither fraudulent nor deceptive may be pressed with such frequency or
vehemence as to intimidate, vex, or harass the recipient. In Ohralik, we made
explicit that 'protection of the public from these aspects of solicitation is a
legitimate and important state interest.'"32 This standard would not be hard
for a government to meet in trying to justify the prohibition of begging.
In Fane the State sought to prohibit accountants from soliciting clients of
other accountants. The Court characterized the targets of the solicitation as
"sophisticated and experienced business executives who understand well the
services that a CPA offers. " 33  To uphold a regulation of speech, the
government must "demonstrate that it is regulating speech in order to address
what is in fact a serious problem and that the preventative measure it proposes
will contribute in a material way to solving that problem. "31 In Fane the
State simply failed to show that the speech restriction advanced a substantial
governmental interest.35 Thus, assuming that a state or local govern-
ment could show that beggars on the street have adverse effects on the
environment and are intimidating to many pedestrians, there is a substantial
likelihood that begging could be circumscribed or prohibited if the courts find
that begging constitutes commercial speech.
C. Public Forum Doctrine
Government regulation of speech "on government property that has
traditionally been available for public expression is subject to the highest
scrutiny."36 In a general statement joined only by Justice Black, Justice
29. Id. at 1798 (citations omitted).
30. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
31. Pane, 113 S. Ct. at 1802.
32. Id. at 1799 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462).
33. Id. at 1803.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1804.
36. ISKON I, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705 (1992). For a recent extensive discussion of the public
forum doctrine see David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IowA L. REv. 143
(1992). Day finds that the doctrine as presently applied by the Court no longer serves to protect
free speech. Id. at 202-03. However, a critical discussion of public forum doctrine is beyond
the scope of this article and therefore this is not the place to deal with his criticism of the Court's
[Vol. 46:215
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Roberts wrote, "[Parks and streets] have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. " "' To take that statement and elevate it to a requirement that
government may only regulate expression in the streets by regulations that are
narrowly tailored to serve compelling government interests could seriously
interfere with the government's ability to keep order. As the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals put it, "To conclude that streets may generally be catego-
rized as traditional public fora may not require us to also conclude that the
streets at all times and under all circumstances are susceptible to characteriza-
tion as a perpetual public forum uniquely available for free expression. "
38
That court upheld a ban against solicitation of occupants of vehicles temporari-
ly stopped on city streets. 39 Another court made a similar point in upholding
a ban on solicitation of employment from a vehicle or by a pedestrian on a
street.' It is too simplistic to deem streets free and open to communication
without taking into account the multiple uses to which streets traditionally have
been put.
Whether begging is protected does not necessarily turn on the public
forum doctrine. Begging is solicitation and arguably differs from using streets
for meetings and parades or simply standing on the sidewalk holding a sign.
Although in ISKCON I the Supreme Court upheld a ban on solicitation in
airports on the grounds that an airport is not a public forum,4' Justice
Kennedy agreed that the ban survived First Amendment scrutiny even though
he thought that the airport was a public forum.42 As he put it:
[T]he Port Authority's ban on the "solicitation and receipt of funds" within
its airport terminals should be upheld under the standards applicable to
speech regulations in public forums. The regulation may be upheld as
either a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, or as a regulation
directed at the nonspeech element of expressive conduct.43
current version of the doctrine.
37. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). Justice Roberts also
stated in the same paragraph that such use was "not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised
in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good
order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." Id. at 516.
38. Acorn v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1986).
39. Id. at 1273; see also International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness of New Orleans, Inc.
v. City of Baton Rouge, 876 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1989); Illinois v. Tosch, 501 N.E.2d 1253 (Ill.
1986).
40. Central Am. Refugee Ctr. v. City of Glen Cove, 753 F. Supp. 437, 440 (E.D.N.Y.
1990).
41. See ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
42. See id. at 2715 (concurring opinion).
43. Id. at 2720 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Under a regime that generally protected begging as pure speech, the public
forum doctrine would enable the government to proscribe begging in confined
environments such as subways.' It also is true that government has far more
power to limit speech-related activity in a nonpublic forum than it does in a
public one under current doctrine. 4 But the issue with which this Article is
concerned goes not to an evaluation of the public forum doctrine but rather to
the question of the nature of begging under the First Amendment. While
government regulation of begging in a nonpublic forum stands a far better
chance of surviving judicial scrutiny, regulation of begging in a public forum
might also be upheld. The nature of the forum affects the level of scrutiny but
does not necessarily determine the result.46
D. Charitable Solicitation
Charitable solicitation, in the view taken by the Supreme Court, is so
intertwined with the exercise of free speech rights that it must be treated as
protected speech.47 It has been argued that this intertwining arises because
soliciting money conveys a message of "the socio-economic and political
realities of our economically-stratified system." 48 Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment49 is best read as finding action intertwined
with speech when advocacy groups utilized solicited funds to exercise free
speech. The organizations thereby violated a regulation requiring that seventy-
five percent of the money collected be paid out rather than used for adminis-
tration.50 In Schaumburg the Supreme Court said:
Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation
but the latter must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that
solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps
persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular
views on economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality that
44. See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 984 (1990).
45. See, e.g., ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2708 (applying reasonableness standard to a ban on
solicitation in a nonpublic forum). Justice O'Connor, the fifth vote, emphasized that "airports
are not public fora thus only begins our inquiry." Id. at 2712 (concurring opinion).
46. Cf. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding a
ban on sleeping overnight in the context of a demonstration in government-owned parks). In
Clark, the government did not question the right of the organizers to demonstrate in those parks.
47. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988);
Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
48. Knapp, supra note 25, at 416-17.
49. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
50. See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 635-37.
[V/ol. 46:215
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without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely
cease.
51
In the advocacy-group context, there are two aspects of solicitation that give
rise to First Amendment protection; the use of the money collected for
advocacy and the advocacy that takes place when the solicitor engages in
conversation with the prospective donor. While Schaumburg addressed a
problem regarding the use of the proceeds of solicitation, the act of solicitation
itself discussed in Schaumburg also involved "informative and perhaps
persuasive" speech. One cannot conclude that because a beggar asks for
money for personal use, the beggar's conduct amounts to advocacy in the
sense that the charitable solicitor's explanation of a charitable cause's merits
or of a political issue amounts to advocacy.1
2
In Young v. New York City Transit Authority the Second Circuit
distinguished begging from charitable solicitation in these harsh terms: "While
organized charities serve community interests by enhancing communication
and disseminating ideas, the conduct of begging and panhandling in the
subway amounts to nothing less than a menace to the common good."" One
need not take such an extreme view of begging to disagree with Judge Meskil,
who in Young said, "[B]egging is indistinguishable from charitable solicitation
for First Amendment purposes. To hold otherwise would mean that an
individual's plight is worthy of less protection in the eyes of the law than the
interests addressed by an organized group. "I
The distinction does not go to the value placed on the particular cause at
issue, but rather to the fact that beggars solicit money for themselves, not to
advocate a cause or to use the money to engage in advocacy. Judge MeskiU
seems to substitute his sympathy for the beggars' plight for First Amendment
analysis. Nothing in the restriction on begging prevents the beggar from
engaging in advocacy by discussion or by holding a sign describing the
problems of the homeless or the poor. But that point seems to have eluded
Judge Meskill, who says, "To suggest that these individuals, who are
obviously struggling to survive, are free to engage in First Amendment activity
in their spare time ignores the harsh reality of the life of the urban poor. "55
51. Id. at 632.
52. See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 154-58 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990). The court said, "[N]either Schaumburg nor its progeny stand for
the proposition that begging and panhandling are protected speech under the First Amendment.
Rather, these cases hold that there is a sufficientnexus between solicitationby organized charities
and a 'variety of speech interests' to invoke protection under the First Amendment." Id. at 155.
53. Id. at 156.
54. Id. at 167 (Meskill, J., concurring and dissenting).
55. Id. at 166 (Meskill, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Judge Meskill fails to appreciate that the First Amendment protects one's right
to be free from a government restriction on communication. If one's personal
circumstances do not allow communication, that does not implicate the First
Amendment. Beyond that, Judge Meskill's comment seems more concerned
with urban poverty, a substantive concern beyond help from an amendment
that serves to protect communication from government regulation. As the
majority in Young said, "[I]t is not the role of this court to resolve all the
problems of the homeless, as sympathetic as we may be."56
The beggar solicits money for personal support, not for eleemosynary
purposes or to engage in political activity. Without financial support,
advocacy becomes difficult. That does not mean that we all have a right to
financial support. Nor does it mean that seeking money for personal gain, as
worthy as we might think the solicitors are, amounts to charitable solicitation.
Nevertheless, in Loper v. New York City Police Department7 a different
panel of the Second Circuit found that begging constituted charitable
solicitation. That court said:
Begging frequently is accompanied by speech indicating the need for food,
shelter, clothing, medical care or transportation. Even without particular-
ized speech, however, the presence of an unkempt and disheveled person
holding out his or her hand or a cup to receive a donation itself conveys
a message of need for support and assistance. We see little difference
between those who solicit for organized charities and those who solicit for
themselves in regard to the message conveyed. The former are commumi-
cating the needs of others while the latter are communicating their personal
needs. Both solicit the charity of others. The distinction is not a signifi-
cant one for First Amendment purposes."
In light of that statement, little more can be said that would not be repetitious.
The distinction lies in soliciting for personal gain as opposed to soliciting for
those organized to serve the needs of others or to engage in political advocacy
on behalf of others. Beggars, like charitable solicitors, seek something for
nothing. Whether seeking something for nothing, by itself, renders one a
charity under present doctrine remains open.
56. Young, 903 F.2d at 156-57.
57. 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
58. Id. at 704.
[Vol. 46:215
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E. The O'Brien Test
Although a request for, and the possible receipt of, money constitutes
activity rather than expression, that activity arguably also conveys "a message
of need for support and assistance." 9 Thus, arguably the regulation of
begging requires application of the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in
United States v. O'Brien ° to govern the regulation of conduct that also
communicates ideas.61 Under that test:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. 62
Perhaps the most difficult problem here is whether the test applies at all.
Regulation of begging is not within the constitutional power of government if
begging itself is considered speech. It is on this question that the major
controversy rests. Thus, the O'Brien test aids little in solving this controver-
sy. Consequently, one must first assume that begging constitutes conduct for
the purposes of discussion, then go on to apply the other elements of the test.
In Loper the police argued that the ban on begging served the purpose of
allowing the police to control many deleterious effects of begging that were
within the government's regulatory power.63 According to the police, some
beggars make false or fraudulent representations and others station themselves
in front of banks and automatic teller machines; moreover, beggars generally
become more aggressive when they are allowed to congregate. 4 Although
few arrests were made under the statute, the police still found the prohibition
useful in enabling them to control begging and to limit the tendency toward
greater aggressiveness and the commission of more serious crimes.6 The
Loper court suggested that the police could control the aggressive elements of
59. Id. at 704.
60. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
61. Id. at 376.
62. Id. at 377.
63. Loper, 999 F.2d at 701.
64. Id.
65. Id.
1995]
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begging by using other statutes' and found that the statute in question "in no
way advances substantial and important governmental interests." 67
The court's conclusion is difficult to understand. It seems that maintain-
ing public order constitutes an important or at least substantial governmental
interest. The Loper court took the position that because charitable solicitation
was permitted, begging had to be permitted even though the statute permitted
soliciting only by those organizations registered with the Secretary of State or
falling within a specific exemption in the statute.' Presumably this argument
asks whether the authorities have a problem with soliciting in general as
opposed to soliciting only by beggars. However, the government's argument
is that begging presents a problem, based on the effects of such conduct, that
charitable solicitation does not present. This point of view suggests that the
government does, in fact, have a substantial interest.
In United States v. O'Brien9 the Supreme Court upheld a conviction for
burning a draft card despite the expressive element involved in that act, which
took place as part of an antiwar demonstration." The Court did not question
the government's interest in requiring the preservation of the draft card by
prohibiting its burning, even though the draft system could have been managed
by using other forms of identification. Certainly, begging falls far short of
draft card burning as expressive conduct. O'Brien enables the courts to
separate legitimate regulation from content-based regulation. O'Brien does not
license the courts to weigh the importance of the government's interest against
the effect of the regulation on speech; rather, it allows the courts to see
whether the government acts to further a legitimate interest rather than
preventing communication. Thus, under O'Brien, when a legitimate
government interest exists, as long as it is not trivial, the courts must accept
it and proceed to consider the final factor in O'Brien, whether "the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest."'"
Before turning to that factor, one point needs to be analyzed. In Loper
the court maintained its argument that the government could not treat beggars
differently from organized charities because, in theory, a group of beggars
could organize as a charity, solicit money, and pay that money to them-
selves.72 However, that problem does not appear to have presented itself as
66. Id. at 701-02.
67. Id. at 705.
68. 999 F.2d 699, 705 (citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 172, 172-a (McKinney 1993)).
69. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
70. Id. at 377.
71. Id.
72. Loper, 999 F.2d 699, 705 ("Certainly, a member of a charitable, religious or other
organizationwho seeks alms for the organization and is also, as a member, a beneficiary of those
alms should be treated no differently from one who begs for his or her own account.").
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a substantial, practical concern.73 Additionally, if a group of beggars
organized and registered as required or met the statutory exemptions, it might
call into question the ability of the government to police charities to ensure
that such organizations do not use solicited funds for their own purposes. On
the other hand, the court simply may be eliminating the eleemosynary
motivation necessary for an organization to be deemed a charity. If an
eleemosynary motivation is not necessary, then perhaps the Court's decision
shows that any distinction becomes blurred and difficult to administer at the
fringes. Potential manipulation of the term "charity" does not undercut the
idea that the government might have a legitimate interest in prohibiting
unlicensed begging because of its tendency to lead to substantial harm.
The appropriate question is whether the regulation of all begging satisfies
the final factor of the O'Brien test, whether the restriction is "essential" to the
furtherance of a legitimate interest. The court in Loper thought that the
prohibition on all begging went too far because peaceful begging "carries no
harms of the type enumerated by the [police]."' The court appears to be
correct if the final prong of the test is read literally; it certainly is possible to
read the test to suggest that if any other means could serve the same function
and impinge less upon speech, then the regulation fails the test. But such a
literal interpretation neglects the holding of O'Brien itself, where the
government could have used alternate means of identification to identify
registrants even if they had burned their draft cards. Indeed, it is inconceiv-
able to think that the government lacked a means to cope with those who
negligently or inadvertently lost their draft cards. Yet in O'Brien the Supreme
Court upheld the prohibition on draft card burning.
More recently, the Supreme Court has made clear that O'Brien does not
require strict scrutiny of the fit between the statute and the legitimate
governmental purpose it serves. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism7 the Court
stated that the final prong of the O'Brien test is satisfied if the regulation is
"narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral
interests" even though the regulation is not "the least restrictive or least
intrusive means of doing So. "76 This reformulation gives the government
73. A group of poor and homeless people sell a newspaper called the Street News in New
York City. Presumably, this activity is protected under the First Amendment, although some
might consider it a circumvention of the restrictions on begging. But beggars still abound in far
greater numbers than those people selling Street News. At this point, the issue has not been
presented by the existence of widespread circumvention, which, if it were a problem, would have
occurred in the New York City subways. Unless the regulation were shown to be ineffective
because of circumvention, the validity of the regulation remains an important issue.
74. 999 F.2d at 706.
75. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
76. Id. at 798. Although the Court was referring to the time, place, and manner standard,
the statement follows the Court's criticism of the Court of Appeals' use of O'Brien's least
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more leeway in pursuing legitimate objectives but provides little guidance as
to when the government's action should survive the test. In the case of
begging, the prohibition applies to peaceful as well as aggressive begging and
to honest as well as fraudulent requests for money. Consequently, the test
leaves courts with the responsibility of weighing the need for the broad
regulation in accomplishing the government's purpose. Unfortunately, putting
courts in this position encourages them to resort to their personal opinions on
begging when rendering their decisions. State or local governments likely
regulate or prohibit begging because of the difficulty of attempting to prevent
only the aggressive or threatening instances of begging. Rarely will the police
be present to witness those specific instances, although they can be prevented
by prohibiting begging altogether.
The application of O'Brien depends on how one weighs the government's
interest against the importance of begging to the communication of the
messages about poverty and the plight of the homeless. Thus, while O'Brien
might serve to raise the issues, the test gives little guidance about how to
resolve these issues in the context of begging.
F. Time, Place, and Manner
In some settings time, place, and manner analysis will not differ from the
application of the O'Brien test.' To the extent that time, place, and manner
might differ from O'Brien, one could argue that the limitation on begging does
not deprive beggars of the ability to communicate their message. Justice
Kennedy, concurring in upholding the ban on solicitation in airports in
ISKCON 11,78 took a slightly different route and distinguished between a ban
on in-person solicitation and other kinds of solicitation.79 Prohibitions on
begging are aimed at in-person solicitation and to that extent Justice Kennedy's
treatment of solicitation is relevant. In ISKCON II he voted to uphold a ban
on the immediate solicitation of money because such conduct intensifies the
risk of fraud and duress.80 At the same time, Kennedy suggested that the
prohibition survived in part because under the regulation the person soliciting
could "continue to disseminate his message," provided he did not accept
immediate payment; "for example [the person could] distribut[e] preaddressed
envelopes in which potential contributors may mail their donations." 8'
intrusive means test and its conclusion that the O'Brien test is "little, if any, different from the
standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions." Id. (quoting Clark v. Counnity for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984)).
77. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.
78. 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992) (per curiam).
79. Id. at 2723.
80. Id. at 2722.
81. Id. at 2723.
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Viewed in these terms, a ban on begging might be construed as allowing the
distribution of preaddressed envelopes, in which case the ban could be viewed
as a permissible time, place, and manner regulation.'
Nevertheless, the issue really turns on whether one regards the begging
itself as speech. It strains logic to analyze the begging prohibition as one that
prohibits only one form of soliciting money. It is seriously doubtful that the
preaddressed envelope alternative has much meaning in this context. While
begging certainly involves in-person solicitation, and evils attach to it, little is
gained by trying to uphold the regulation of begging under time, place, and
manner analysis. If streets are an inappropriate place for begging, it is not
because of time, place, and manner considerations, but rather because of the
nature of begging itself.
G. Conclusion
Current doctrine does not mandate a particular result with respect to the
protection of begging under the First Amendment. Since the Supreme Court
continues to protect solicitation under the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment, the various doctrines designed to guide the application of the
First Amendment might govern. Those doctrines, as applied to begging, are
sufficiently flexible to enable courts to uphold or strike down prohibitions of
begging. Lack of precedent coupled with the consequent difficulty of
justifying decisions in terms of already enunciated doctrine can create
problems in any area of the law. In this context, in which the question of
whether the First Amendment should protect begging evokes emotional
responses, courts deciding cases under the applicable doctrines retain so much
flexibility that their personal opinions about beggars often appear to drive their
legal conclusions.
Of course, one would not expect that personal views on begging could be
totally eliminated from the analysis. Rather, the problem is that personal
views can be expressed in ways that hide them under the guise of the
application of the doctrines. When courts address emotive issues in situations
that require them to make value judgments, those value judgments should be
made apparent. Given the state of the law, courts can apply the various
multipart tests established by the Supreme Court to reach whatever conclusion
they deem advisable without exposing their own personal values. For a test
to have utility it should at least channel the analysis so that the factors that
drive the decision become apparent on the face of the opinion even when the
test falls short of directing the ultimate conclusion.
82. In ISKCON II, Justice Kennedy stated that "[tihe regulation may be upheld as either a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, or as a regulation directed at the nonspeech
element of expressive conduct." Id. at 2720.
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Another problem arises because begging does not fit neatly within any
particular form of doctrinal analysis. Begging is not really charitable
solicitation, and whether it fits under O'Brien depends upon whether one
think that begging is primarily a communication of ideas or conduct that
incidentally communicates. In Young v. New York City Transit Authority83
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed begging under the charitable
solicitation cases,' O'Brien,' and the public forum analysis, 86 although
the court also thought the speech-versus-conduct analysis played an important
role in the decision. 7 As stated by the court:
Whether with or without words, the object of begging and panhandling
is the transfer of money. Speech simply is not inherent to the act; it is not
of the essence of the conduct. Although our holding today does not
ultimately rest on an ontological distinction between speech and conduct,
we think this case presents a particularly poignant example of how the
distinction subsists ,in right reason and coincides with common sense. To
be sure, these qualities ought not to be forsaken in our legal analysis.88
To use this analysis for begging when deciding whether begging
regulations suppress communication or serve legitimate ends seems more
sensible than trying to fit the regulations within one of the present doctrines
discussed above. 9 Under current law one first must determine which
doctrine applies, a difficult problem in the case of begging. Then, regardless
of which doctrine controls, it usually will fail to mandate a result or even
provide a useful guide for the decision.
Im. BEGGING AS UNPROTECTED CONDUCT UNDER
"FREEDOM OF SPEECH" ANALYSIS
83. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990).
84. Id. at 154-57.
85. Id. at 157-61.
86. Id. at 161-62.
87. Id. at 152-54.
88. Young, 903 F.2d 146, 154.
.89. In this context, Professor William Van Alstyne's discussion of "the formal complexity
in subsets of First Amendment law" is pertinent. W. VAN ALsTYNE, FIRsT AMENDMENT: CASES
AND MATERIALS 290 n.9 (1991). As Van Alstyne stated,
In the natural life of these systems, however, it is also true that the complexity of 'the
rules' thus laid down tends inevitably to engender its own uncertainties .... There
is, moreover, a serious first amendment hazard at risk in these complex approaches.
The risk is that one may lose sight of some organizing philosophy common to all first
amendment cases in trying too hard to figure out which is the 'right' set of rules that
technically appear to govern one's immediate case, and thereby be misled into
foregoing access to a far more powerful set of more general observations that might
well be important to set matters right.
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Supreme Court doctrines often structure analysis and thereby guide the
decisions of lower courts. In addition, good doctrines provide useful tools for
attorneys and make their task easier. The use of doctrines minimizes the
possibility that the values of individual judges will skew their application of
the law. By establishing a particular doctrine the Supreme Court weighs
competing values and directs the lower courts in their analysis of those values
in particular situations. Although the various doctrines described in Part I may
be useful in other contexts, they do not provide much guidance when applied
to begging regulations.' ° In addition, the very existence of so many doctrines
may increase the difficulties for the lower courts due to the necessity of
applying multiple doctrines in begging cases.
When doctrines fail to direct conclusions, courts must resort to the use of
the relevant values in deciding cases. In the case of begging, courts should
decide first whether begging constitutes speech protected by the First
Amendment. If the begging is not speech, application of First Amendment
doctrine is unnecessary. Although such an analysis is relatively simple, it
involves value judgments. To some extent, courts must make value judgments
under the various First Amendment doctrines in dealing with begging;
however, the courts' use of these settled doctrines tends to obfuscate their own
biases. Furthermore, since courts must resort to basic values anyway, there
would be less confusion if courts were allowed to rely exclusively on these
values rather than having to fit their results, when possible, into a number of
different doctrines. The ultimate question turns on whether begging is
protected speech.
In ordinary usage, we equate speech with written or oral communication.
As a result, a tendency exists to consider the use of words as protected by the
First Amendment. But closer analysis reveals that "freedom of speech" covers
much less than the word "speech" as ordinarily used.9 When we recognize
90. Justice John Paul Stevens recently noted the difficulties posed by the attempted application
of doctrines to particular situations without a consideration of the significance of the facts at
issue. He said,
In sum, it seems to me that the attempt to craft black-letter or bright-line rules
of First Amendment law often produces unworkable and unsatisfactory results,
especially when an exclusive focus on rules of general application obfuscates the
specific facts at issue and interests at stake in a given case .... Indeed, a litigant's
misplaced reliance on propositions of law instead of the special facts of the case may
snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
Justice John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, Address in inaugural Ralph Gregory Elliot
First Amendment Lecture at Yale Law School (Oct. 27, 1992), in 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1307
(1993).
91. See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND. L. REv. 265, 272-73 (1981).
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that people use speech to make contracts, commit perjury, engage in
discrimination, extort money, and threaten other's bodily security, 92 it
appears more sensible to create a special meaning for the term "freedom of
speech."' In addition, some communication that we accept as protected,
such as flag burning,' would strike most people as conduct rather than
speech. Nevertheless, flag burning receives constitutional protection, as do
other forms of symbolic expression that do not involve the use of words. 5
Thus, "freedom of speech" includes expression that does not normally fit
within the ordinary use of the term "speech." Consequently, the idea of
protected expression probably fits more closely with "freedom of speech" than
with any concept stemming from the ordinary meaning of speech.
Even when doctrines clearly apply to a given case, courts still have to
resort to the basic First Amendment values. In the case of subversive speech,
for example, courts must distinguish between "advocacy of the use of force"
and actual incitement to "imminent lawless action."96 Consider this famous
statement by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is
acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy
stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the
expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the
speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. 97
Of course, the fact that every idea is an incitement only means that ideas must
not be suppressed (unless imminent unlawful action clearly would follow). As
Justice Holmes stated, "[Tihe only meaning of free speech is that they should
be given their chance and have their way."98 Even when the Supreme Court
92. Id. at 270.
93. Id. at 273.
94. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
95. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam) (displaying United
States flag upside down with a peace symbol taped on it); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing black armband to protest United States'
policy in Vietnam).
96. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curian).
97. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (dissenting opinion).
98. Id. The basic values behind freedom of speech drive this conclusion, but the language
of the statement does not lead to a conclusion unless one takes those values into account. The
difficulty with many legal doctrines is that words cannot perform the desired task. When a
plurality of the Supreme Court adopted Judge Learned Hand's famous modification of the clear
and present danger test to discount the "gravity of the evil" by its improbability, they said that
Hand's formulation "takes into consideration those factors which we deem relevant, and relates
their significances. More we cannot expect from words." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 510 (1951) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
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has formulated useful doctrines, application of the First Amendment's
protection of "freedom of speech" often involves a fact-sensitive analysis that
is guided primarily by the underlying values of the First Amendment. Thus,
when a court must decide whether an activity constitutes protected speech, it
does not have to get involved in a novel task.
Whether begging involves protected expression seems relatively easy to
decide. A beggar typically wants money and consequently asks passersby for
money. The beggar has no intention to communicate his views about the
problems of poverty or homelessness. Communication on these issues remains
unimpeded by statutes prohibiting begging. The beggar is free to state his
views either orally or by means of a picket sign. The prohibition only
prevents the request for, and receipt of, money. This simple analysis appears
to answer the question. The basic values of the First Amendment are not
implicated, and it should not be hard to conclude that begging is not
expression protected by the "freedom of speech." In short, the analysis
simply involves determining whether the speech, or communicative act, is used
to convey thoughts or ideas, to entertain, to provide aesthetic enjoyment, or,
conversely, whether the speech constitutes part of a transaction or conduct that
is not protected." Where doctrines do not fit because speech does not
constitute protected expression under the concept of "freedom of speech," a
court should be able to say so and decide the case in accordance with that
judgment.
Applying the freedom of speech protections of the First Amendment by
distinguishing speech from action is a venerable ideal' that has not gained
wide acceptance. 10' Part of the problem may stem from trying to do too
much with First Amendment theories. It is always easy to demolish theories
proposed by others in this area because words fail to capture the basic
principle of the First Amendment when they are used to try to mandate results
in unforeseen cases. At the same time, it seems clear that the First Amend-
ment does not protect the mere use of words. Consider perjury, bribery, and
99. Professor Cass Sunstein recently suggested a tiered approach to the First Amendment in
which political speech would receive the highest degree of protection. Cass R. Sunstein, Free
Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 304-07 (1992). Sunstein's definition of political speech
requires a kind of analysis that does not seem to differ materially from the approach suggested
in the text. Sunstein explained,
For present purposes I will treat speech as political when it is both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue. It seems
implausible to think that words warrant the highest form of protection if the speaker
does not even intend to communicate a message; the First Amendment does not put
gibberish at the core even if it is taken, by some in the audience, to mean something.
Id. at 304.
100. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 19 (1970).
101. See JOHN RAWLS, POLmCAL LIBERALISM 345 n.56 (1993); Schauer, supra note 91, at
275.
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false advertising: all involve the use of words, but none enjoys First
Amendment protection."° The notion of applying the First Amendment to
bribery and perjury is illogical, and presumably the absence of decisions on
this point reveals that people do not litigate it. Justice Douglas once explained
that falsely shouting fire in a theater is not protected speech because such
"speech is brigaded with action." 3 It is an apt way of making the point.
IV. CONCLUSION
I recognize that many people find the regulation of begging morally
wrong because they see no harm posed by a simple request for money. Thus,
it is easier to defend the prohibition of "aggressive" begging than of begging
generally. I have chosen to address begging in general because my argument
is that begging does not constitute piotected expression under the First
Amendment. Sympathy for the plight of the beggar, coupled with a perception
that beggars cause annoyance but not harm, probably leads many to conclude
that the First Amendment should protect begging. Such a conclusion confuses
personal views with the concept of freedom of expression. It certainly would
seem heartless to prevent a poverty-stricken homeless person from asking for
and receiving help from a sympathetic passerby. However, this line of
reasoning does not ask whether expression is being proscribed but whether
there exists a legitimate governmental purpose for the prohibition of begging.
Arguably, if no such purpose exists, the prohibition would be unconstitutional
because it would violate the right to due process under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments. The failure of courts to engage in rigorous substantive due
process analysis, outside of very limited areas involving fundamental rights,
102. See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 305 (stating that these and other categories of speech
clearly "are not entitled to the highest degree of constitutional protection"); Schauer, supra note
91, at 274 ("[C]ontract law, antitrust law, and the like are excluded [from First Amendment
protection] for reasons having little if anything to do with the extent or the imminence of the
danger. They are excluded, and properly so, because they have nothing to do with what the
concept of free speech is all about.").
103. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice
Douglas continued by pointing out that the statement and the action were "inseparable and a
prosecution can be launched for the overt acts actually caused." Id. at 456-57. In the case of
begging, a verbal or nonverbal request for money is the means by which the transaction is
initiated, and the request forms part of the "action" that we call begging or panhandling.
There is some reason to think that the present Supreme Court recognizes the distinction
between speech and action as material for decision-making, even if the concept does not find its
way into the Court's doctrine. InR.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), the Court
held that an ordinance prohibiting the burning of a cross violated the freedom of speech
protections of the First Amendment. Then, the following Term, the Court held a statute
constitutional that provided that a penalty for a crime could be enhanced where a victim was
selected because of his race, because the statute was aimed at conduct unprotected by the First
Amendment. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993).
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should not justify the misuse of the First Amendment to strike down silly
laws.104
Begging constitutes a part of a transaction involving the transfer of
money. It does not constitute protected expression under the First Amend-
ment. A prohibition on begging prevents the transfer of funds, but it does not
prevent the expression of views about the plight of the needy or the homeless.
Under present First Amendment doctrines, courts must labor through
marginally relevant analyses to decide cases involving prohibitions on begging.
The cause of the First Amendment would be better served if, before having to
apply First Amendment doctrines, courts could decide whether the regulated
activity constituted protected speech. Begging is not protected speech. The
reason for this conclusion is better articulated in terms of basic First
Amendment values than the variety of arguably applicable Supreme Court
doctrines courts currently use.
104. Substantive due process is outside the scope of this article; however, substantive due
process seems the proper issue if one finds the prohibition of begging unjustified.
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